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This study explores the relationship between media usage and political en-
gagement for citizens, who are neither invested nor supportive to politics.
It starts from two fiercely debated conditions in Western Europe. First,
it is well-researched that there is a noticeable number of disaffected cit-
izens, who neither support nor show interest in the various institutions of
established democracies. Second, there is a widespread notion that polit-
ical news increasingly focuses on conflict, scandals, personalized stories
and sensational events. We adapt Gamson’s (1968) mobilization hypo-
thesis and show that media usage is related to more political engagement,
especially among democratically disaffected persons.
This study uses novel survey data on the UK, France, Germany and
Switzerland, which contains precise and multifaceted measures on media
usage, trust in democratic institutions, political interest and political effic-
acy. While we can only present correlational evidence at the moment, our
results show support for the modified Gamson mobilization hypothesis,
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Introduction
In the last years, a wide range of events, such as the London riots of 2011
or the many successes of anti-systemic fringe parties throughout Europe, have
been interpreted as manifestations of a fundamental crisis of support for demo-
cratic governance and stability (Hartleb, 2015). This pessimistic interpretation
is reinforced by findings by the existing literature that a noticeable number of
citizens are alienated from politics (Doorenspleet, 2012). Given their low levels
of political participation, these citizens should therefore be seen as ‘disaffected
democrats’ (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002).
However, while it is a well documented fact that citizens express primarily
negative orientations towards the actors and institutions that govern them (e.g.
Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Norris, 2011), a competing literature highlights the
merits of this condition. Growing dissatisfaction is seen as the expression of high
expectations and critical outlooks on politics, leading to high levels of electoral
and non-electoral participation, and, in consequence, to the improvement of
democratic processes and structures (Klingemann, 1999). In essence, this inter-
pretation boils down to Gamson’s (1968) theory of political mobilization. Ac-
cording to Gamson, support for democratic institutions interacts with political
efficacy, which is the citizen’s belief that they can understand and meaningfully
impact politics. Combined with high political efficacy, disaffection motivates
active participation and thus contributes to a mobilized citizenry. However,
when combined with feelings of inefficacy, disaffection leads to alienation and
is harmful to the political system. Despite the intuitive merits of this theory
it consistently produced unsupporting empirical evidence, pointing to a more
complicated interaction between individual attitudes and political engagement
(Sigelman and Feldman, 1983).
We maintain that the media is part of this puzzle’s resolution. In line with
2
media mobilization theorists, we assume that media increasingly provide news
in an entertaining content, which caters to the large part of the population
that that does not pay close attention to politics (Schudson, 1998; Lupia, 1994).
Hence, an increase in media consumption actually can be expected to be related
to increases in political engagement among the disaffected citizens.
After the elaboration of the theoretical argument, we present novel empirical
evidence from a survey conducted in the UK, France, Germany, and Switzerland
supporting this hypothesis.
Gamson’s mobilization hypothesis and media usage
A growing literature understands the contemporary lack of political support as
fundamental threat to democratic governance and stability, more precisely as
‘anti-politics’ (Jennings and Stoker, ming), ‘counter-democracy’ (Rosanvallon,
2008), or a ‘hollowing out’ of democracy (Mair, 2013). Such diagnoses of a
crisis of support of democracy usually entail symptoms like declining particip-
ation, a growing dissociation between political decision makers and ‘ordinary
citizens’ and a drastic erosion of trust in and satisfaction with democratic in-
stitutions. In essence, these diagnoses build on prominent work on the role of
political support for the effective governance and legitimacy of democratic re-
gimes. According to Easton (1965), diffuse support is a necessary condition for
democratic legitimacy, since it helps citizens to tolerate democratic regimes also
in times of poorer performance. Similarly, Verba and Almond (1980) consider a
positively oriented citizenry towards the political elite to be conducive to stable
democratic governance.
In sharp contrast to the pessimistic point of view, the decline in political
support led a second group of scholars to maintain that the decrease in levels of
political support stems from an increase in citizens’ democratic expectations and
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actually is a sign of a positive development (Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Welzel,
2007; Norris, 2011). Accordingly, higher democratic aspirations are seen as
necessary for the healthy functioning of political institutions. More suspicious,
vigilant and mobilized citizens constitute an ever better counter-weight towards
poweful people and institutions (Hardin, 2004). This is most clearly formulated
in Gamson’s (1968) theory of political mobilisation. Gamson argues that a lack
of political support does not necessarily contribute to political alienation, since
it depends on a citizen’s feeling of political efficacy. The combination of lacking
political support and high political efficacy should motivate active participation.
However, when combined with feelings of inefficacy, a lack political support leads
to disaffection and is a bad sign for the health of the political system.
Taken together, the aforementioned literature points to two distinct dimen-
sions of political support (see Figure 1): allegiance in terms of specific support
such as trust in government as well as more general support in terms of satisfac-
tion with democracy; and investedness in politics, which is the combination of
high interest and high political efficacy. Building on recent research on political
distrust (Bertsou, 2015), we emphasize the need for a broad and comprehensive
specification of both dimensions. More specific trust and more diffuse satsfac-
tion are both integral parts of political allegiance. In a similar vein, political
efficacy and interest in politics are essential components of investedness. The
two dimensions of support further lead to the differentiation of four stylized
persons: A deferent person is both satisfied with as well as invested into polit-
ics; Complacent rather blindly support the democratic regime, since they are
neither interested nor effacious in politics; critical persons are investested, but
they do not trust political institutions and are not satisfied with the way demo-
cracy works; disaffected persons, finally, are neither invested nor allegiant.
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Figure 1: Dimensions of political support
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According to Gamson’s mobilization hypothesis, disaffected citizens should
be more motivated to engage in political action in order to voice their grievances
and alter those processes. However, despite the intuitive merits of this theory,
it consistently produced unsupporting or very weak emprical evidence, which
points to a more complicated interaction between individual political attitudes
(Sigelman and Feldman, 1983; Bertsou, 2015). We maintain that, in today’s
democracies, media use plays an important role in turning the grievances of
disaffected citizens into political participation.
In the literature on the democratic quality of the media, the media’s per-
formance is often criticized as flawed (see Esser and Matthes (2013) for a com-
prehensive overview). The reasons for this diagnosis is twofold. First, media
systems are increasingly centralized into a few large media conglomerates, which
raises fears that the diversity of viewpoints is diminished and that the independ-
ence of media from political or economic players is lost (Champlin and Knoedler,
2006). Second, mass media shape their political news coverage according to the
maximum attention of a wide public (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). Since only
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a small fraction of the population wants detailled, substantive information on
politics, political news production focuses more and more on scandals, sensa-
tional events and conflict within the political elite (Bennett, 2003). This is taken
as evidence that the mass media fail in their democratic function (Kleinnijenhuis
et al., 2006).
Other authors, however, argue against judging media by highly normative
expectations on democratic quality, since they have neither the means nor the
incentives to do so (Mu¨ller, 2015). Since most of the media outlets are run as
commercial enterprises, it is rather surprising that they have retained a public-
service orientation at all (Graber, 2004). Taking the same line of argument,
it is regularly shown that only a very small part of the population is actu-
ally interested in becoming the well-informed and eagerly participating citizen
democratic theory suggests (Lupia, 1994; Norris, 2000; Semetko and Tworzecki,
2012). Most citizens are satsified with political decisions that are based on se-
lective knowledge and heuristics. Accordingly, a more realistic interpretation
of democratic citizenship is that citizens do not need to pay close attention to
politics all the time, they only have to follow the news in order to notice when
their interests are in danger (Schudson, 2008). And this is actually more likely
when the news is presented in an interesting way. Sensationalist media coverage
may therefore be more successful in engaging people and changing their minds
than the best in-depth political analysis.
This is why we expect that media usage is related to more political engage-
ment, especially among democratically disaffected persons. The dominance of
entertaining content in the media whould therefore have redistributional con-
sequences. Invested and allegiant persons are likely to be unaffected or even
discouraged to particpate in politics by media consumption, while political en-
gagement and media consumption should be positively related among disaffected
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persons.
Data and Estimation
The data for this study was collected in the context of the Democratic Gov-
ernance and Citizens Survey conducted in 2015/16 (Democracy, 2016). The
survey contains the answers of 4’033 respondents in France, Germany, the UK
and Switzerland. Table 3 in the appendix lists the averages, standard deviations
and number of missing values for all items used.
As for interest in politics, two items that ask about the interest in the politics
of the local authority as well as the respective country are used. Both items are
measured on four items from 1 = not at all interested to 4 = very interested.
Satisfaction with democracy is asked for the local and the national level as well.
Political trust is surveyed concerning the national government and parliament.
All these questions are measured on a ten-item scale. The usage of the four
most important media channels is asked as follows: How many days in the last
week did you read the political content of a newspaper (print or online), watch
news on TV, use the Internet (Websites, Social Networks, Blogs, Twitter, etc.)
to obtain information about politics and society, and listen to radio news? The
scale for every media usage ranges from 0 = never and 1 = less than once a
week to 8 = every day.
The dependent variables are constructed as cumulative indices for five dif-
ferent forms conventional political engagement – casting of vote in the last
national, local, regional and European parliament election as well as in the
last local or national referendum – and four different forms of unconventional
political engagement – contacting a politician, government, or government offi-
cial; signing a petition; participating in a public demonstration; and boycotting
certain products.
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In addition, the gender, age and educational level (harmonized across coun-
tries using the International Standard Classification of Education of the UN-
ESCO) are added as controls to the models presented in the following. Finally,
iterative factor weights are added in order to balance disproportionately distrib-
uted drop-out rates across countries.
The relationships between political support, media usage and political en-
gagement in the following is explored using a maximum likelihood factor analysis
and several linear regression models. In order to keep the different models com-
parable, each numeric variable is standardized by dividing it by two times its
standard deviation (Gelman, 2008).
Results
The analyses start with the establishment of the basic dimensions of political
support. Our assumption that the different aspects of trust, satisfaction, interest
and efficacy are components of two dimensions is clearly confirmed by the results
of the factor analysis as presented in Table 1. The chi square statistic, as well
the optimal coordinates, acceleration factor and parallel analysis (results not
shown), suggest that a two factor solution is by far the optimal one. The
four indicators on trust and satisfaction mainly load in the first factor, while
the indicators related to political efficacy and interest are closely linked to the
second factor. Only the two indicators related to the local level, satisfaction
with and interest in the politics of the local authority, exhibit a rather low but
still substantial loading with their factors. Nevertheless, the two factors are
clearly shaped. As already mentioned, can be specified as allegiance to and
investedness into politics, respectively.
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Table 1: Unrotated maximum likelihood factor analysis of trust, satisfaction,
interest and efficacy
Factor 1 Factor 2
Trust in government 0.87
Trust in parliament 0.92
Satisfaction with local democracy 0.50
Satisfaction with national democracy 0.75
Interest in national politics 0.65
Understanding of politics 0.89
Qualified to participate 0.82
Interest in local politics 0.44
Eigenvalue 2.46 2.12
Cumulative Variance 0.31 0.57
Labels Allegiant Invested
Chi square statistic 911.91*** DF=13
Figure 2 shows the correlation between these two factors, which is non-
linear but very weak1. In addition, the size of the groups specified in Figure 1
is presented as number of respondents which are above or below average of the
two factors. The deferent are the biggest group with a share of 32%. About
one third of the respondents are thus supportive to politics and the political
insitutions on both aspects. The disaffected citizens, which are neither allegiant
nor invested, make for exactly one fourth of all respondents (25%). The two
other groups, the critical and complacent citizens, are equal with a share of
22%.
1Note that this is the unrotated solution of the factor analysis.
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Figure 2: 4 types of political support
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How does media use come into play with regards to these results on polit-
ical support and political engagement? Since we are primarily intersted in the
newspaper, internet, TV and radio use of the disaffected citizens, we show first
regression results on the indices for conventional and unconventional particip-
ation only for these respondents in Table 2. As for the frequency of TV and
newspaper use, the relationship is clearly positive for both conventional and un-
conventional participation. Hence, disaffected citizens who read about politics
in the newspapers and watch TV news more often, are also participating more
in elections, votes, boycots, demostrations and petitions. The same holds for
radio use and unconventional participation. Of course, no causal interpretation
of this result is possible, i.e. it remains an open question whether disaffected
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citizens seek more political information in the media because they participate
more regularly or vice versa. However, it is clear that political disaffection is
less harmful to democracy if people use media to get informed about politics
and participate more often. Quite surprisingly in the context of claims that the
internet is a ‘liberation technology’ for people who are traditionally underrep-
resented in politics (Sloam, 2013; Coleman and Blumler, 2009), internet use is
not related to higher political engagment of the politically disaffected.
Table 2: Linear regressions relating media use and political participation for the
disaffected
Conventional participtation Unconventional participtation
Estimate Std.Err Pr(> |t|) Estimate Std.Err Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) -0.322 0.286 -0.069 0.194
TV use 0.214 0.084 * 0.196 0.055 ***
gender 0.104 0.085 0.057 0.058
age 0.331 0.101 ** -0.065 0.066
education 0.239 0.102 * 0.297 0.070 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.169 0.168
F-statistic 6.284(7/175 DF)*** 7.02(7/213 DF)***
(Intercept) -0.373 0.304 -0.053 0.201
radio use 0.128 0.088 0.157 0.058 **
gender 0.127 0.087 0.037 0.059
age 0.372 0.103 *** -0.056 0.068
education 0.223 0.103 * 0.268 0.071 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.146 0.143
F-statistic 5.403(7/173DF)*** 6.186(7/210DF)***
(Intercept) -0.136 0.279 0.064 0.196
newspaper use 0.271 0.084 ** 0.147 0.060 *
gender 0.158 0.084 . 0.072 0.059
age 0.292 0.103 ** -0.082 0.070
education 0.195 0.100 . 0.248 0.073 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.191 0.130
F-statistic 7.073(7/173 DF)*** 5.625(7/209 DF)***
(Intercept) -0.241 0.293 0.021 0.201
internet use 0.098 0.099 0.091 0.067
gender 0.132 0.088 0.072 0.061
age 0.360 0.104 *** -0.030 0.070
education 0.202 0.105 . 0.263 0.073 ***
Adj. R-squared 0.136 0.116
F-statistic 5.043(7/173 DF)*** 5.06(7/209 DF)***
Notes: Country fixed effects applied;
Significance codes: ***=0.001, **=0.01, *=0.05, .=0.1
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A last step of the analysis concerns the comparisons of the media usage by
the disaffected with the other three groups identified in the factor analysis. To
this aim, Figure and show predicted values for persons which are one standard
deviation below (dashed lines) and above (solid lines) the average of investedness
and below (grey lines) and above (black lines) the average of allegiance. In
addition, the 10% confidence intervals are shown.
With the exception of internet use and conventional participation, the re-
lationship between media usage and participation is consistently positive for
the disaffected persons (the grey dashed lines). For the other groups, the rela-
tionship is less clear and sometimes even negative. Especially for conventional
participation, media usage has clearly redistributional consequences, since the
differences in political engagement among the people who use media are less
pronounced than the differences for individuals who do not get informed via the
media.
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Figure 3: Relationship between media usage and conventional participation
at different levels of support and investedness: predicted values from linear
regression models
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Figure 4: Relationship between media usage and unconventional participation
at different levels of support and investedness: predicted values from linear
regression models
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Conclusion
Our results show that the Gamson mobilization hypothesis should be comple-
mented with media usage. For most media, the empirical evidence corroborates
that disaffected persons with a higher media consumption also engage more of-
ten in conventional as well as unconventional forms of political participation.
Moreover, across the four groups separated by high or low investedness and alle-
giance, media is most positively related to higher levels of participation among
the disaffected citizens.
Our interpretation is that the increase in non-substantive, entertaining con-
tent in the media has redistributional consequences. Political news disseminated
by the media is better received by disaffected citizens, while the mobilization of
interested and allegiant persons is less pronouncedly linekd to media consump-
tion.
So far, we could only present correlational evidence, which hopefully mo-
tivates further research with a focus on the causal mechanisms of these rela-
tionships. In this regard, we found that some few panel data sets such as the
Swiss household panel allow an examination of the causal relationships between
political support nedia usage and poltical engagement, although only for a few
years and a restricted set of indicators.
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Appendix
Table 3: Averages, standard deviations and number of missing values for main
indicators used in the analyses
Indicator Average SD N missing
Trust in government 5.87 2.34 77
Trust in parliament 5.54 2.58 44
Satisfaction with local democracy 6.14 2.21 129
Satisfaction with national democracy 5.56 2.39 47
Interest in local politics 2.97 0.84 23
Interest in national politics 3.21 0.76 25
Understanding of politics 6.19 2.26 45
Qualified to participate 5.34 2.78 57
Newspaper use 3.73 2.71 38
TV use 3.80 2.59 21
Internet use 2.98 2.68 73
Radio use 3.60 2.72 55
Conventional participation 2.36 1.00 787
Unconventional participation 1.38 1.15 170
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Table 4: Linear regressions relating media use and political participation
conventional participation unconventional participation
Estimate Std.Err Pr(> |t|) Estimate Std.Err Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) 0.717 0.053 *** 0.359 0.045 ***
internet -0.001 0.018 0.087 0.016 ***
invested 0.093 0.024 *** -0.087 0.023 ***
allegiant 0.263 0.026 *** 0.284 0.024 ***
gender 0.045 0.017 ** 0.036 0.016 *
age 0.180 0.018 *** -0.006 0.016
education 0.090 0.018 *** 0.097 0.016 ***
internet:invested 0.064 0.034 . -0.014 0.031
internet:allegiant 0.020 0.036 0.005 0.032
invested:allegiant -0.030 0.040 -0.034 0.038
internet:invested:allegiant 0.094 0.066 0.082 0.060
Adjusted R-squared 0.199 0.176
F-statistic 57.55***(13/2954 DF) 57.77***(13/3447 DF)
(Intercept) 0.703 0.053 *** 0.370 0.046 ***
newspaper 0.046 0.018 * 0.074 0.017 ***
invested 0.129 0.027 *** -0.124 0.025 ***
allegiant 0.349 0.030 *** 0.294 0.028 ***
gender 0.050 0.017 ** 0.036 0.016 *
age 0.173 0.018 *** -0.034 0.016 *
education 0.091 0.018 *** 0.104 0.016 ***
newspaper:invested -0.026 0.032 0.047 0.030
newspaper:allegiant -0.122 0.034 *** -0.019 0.032
invested:allegiant 0.007 0.044 -0.065 0.041
newspaper:invested:allegiant 0.070 0.058 0.135 0.054 *
Adjusted R-squared 0.205 0.174
F-statistic 60.24***(13/2976 DF) 57.36***(13/3470 DF)
(Intercept) 0.702 0.053 *** 0.412 0.046 ***
radio 0.006 0.018 0.044 0.016 **
invested 0.168 0.026 *** -0.097 0.024 ***
allegiant 0.269 0.030 *** 0.307 0.027 ***
gender 0.051 0.017 ** 0.034 0.016 *
age 0.185 0.018 *** -0.032 0.016 *
education 0.094 0.018 *** 0.099 0.016 ***
radio:invested -0.067 0.031 * 0.020 0.029
radio:allegiant 0.010 0.033 -0.017 0.030
invested:allegiant 0.012 0.044 -0.058 0.041
radio:invested:allegiant 0.000 0.054 0.121 0.051 *
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.173
F-statistic 58.49***(13/2966 DF) 56.84***(13/3455 DF)
(Intercept) 0.722 0.052 *** 0.428 0.045 ***
tv -0.015 0.018 0.007 0.016
invested 0.211 0.028 *** -0.079 0.026 **
allegiant 0.280 0.032 *** 0.311 0.030 ***
gender 0.050 0.017 ** 0.031 0.016 *
age 0.186 0.018 *** -0.025 0.016
education 0.094 0.018 *** 0.104 0.016 ***
tv:invested -0.112 0.031 *** -0.003 0.028
tv:allegiant -0.010 0.034 -0.024 0.031
invested:allegiant -0.054 0.048 -0.080 0.045 .
tv:invested:allegiant 0.093 0.053 . 0.129 0.050 **
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.169
F-statistic 60.06***(13/2985 DF) 55.6***(13/3483 DF)
Notes: Significance codes: ***=0.001, **=0.01, *=0.05, .=0.1
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